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Intermediate Sanctions: Protection for
Charitable Organizations and the
Donations They Receive
Allison M. Sawyer*

I. Introduction
In 2001, American individuals, foundations, and corporations
donated $212 billion to charitable organizations.' Of that amount,
$160.7 billion represented donations from individual American
citizens.2 This figure demonstrates that despite frozen wages, lost
jobs, and plunges in stock market value, Americans continue to give.
Nevertheless, as a result of the declining economy, donations have
decreased across the country.3 Charitable donations dropped 2.3%
from 2000 to 2001, a larger decline than has been seen in average
recession years. 4
The decrease in donations has forced charitable organizations
to be more creative. Facing the possibility of closing their doors,
charities regularly employ professional solicitors who have the
marketing expertise to increase donations. Unfortunately, that
expertise imposes a significant cost on charities and donors, because
a bulk of the donations is used to pay solicitors rather than applied
towards the charitable purpose. When faced with the choice between
earning very little with a professional solicitor or nothing at all,
charities understandably opt for the former.

* J.D. candidate, May 2003, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.
Business Administration, 2000, cum laude, Wayne State University. The author
wishes to thank her family and friends for all of their support.
1 Nicole Lewis, Charitable Giving Slides, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June

27, 2002, at 27.
2

id.

3 id.

4 Id. (noting that charitable contributions decrease by an average of 1.1% in
recession years).
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Interested in protecting consumers from fraud, various
governmental agencies have attempted to regulate how charitable
organizations solicit donations. In the past, regulation of charitable5
organizations has been within the domain of the Attorney General.
After Attorneys General nationwide attempted to regulate the method
by which charities solicited donations, but were defeated on First
Amendment grounds, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") stepped
in with regulation of its own. 6 In 1996, Congress enacted I.R.C.
§ 4958, 7 also known as "intermediate sanctions." Originally directed
at regulating the growing non-profit health care field, this provision
imposes an excise tax on individuals who engage in excess benefit
transactions with charitable organizations. 9 When the temporary
regulations were released in 1998, however, it was clear that § 4958
would extend far beyond the realm of health care as a result of the
continuous growth of the not-for-profit sector.' ° In 2002, the IRS and
the Treasury Department issued the final regulations, which iterate
the broad regulatory and enforcement power granted to the IRS."
This article will (1) examine how First Amendment protection
precluded the states from effectively regulating charitable
solicitations, (2) describe how intermediate sanctions are imposed in
the context of charitable organizations, and (3) explain why this
provision will be an effective tool in protecting charitable
organizations and donors from fraud.

5 See Lisa Loftin, Protecting the CharitableInvestor: A Rationalefor
Donor
Enforcement of Restricted Gifts, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 361, 382 (1999).
6 James J. Fishman, Improving CharitableAccountability, 62 MD.L. REV.

218, 265 (2003).
7 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (codified as
I.R.C. § 4958 (2000)).
8 See generally Pamela S. Kaufman, A Selective Review of the Intermediate
Sanctions Temp. Regs. - Generally Improved All Around, 94 J.TAX'N 301 (2001)
(discussing the taxes on excess benefit transactions as "intermediate sanctions," as
they are commonly known).

9 See Intermediate Sanctions, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958 (2002).
'0 See id.
' See id.
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II. Charitable Solicitations Escape Regulation by Way
of First Amendment Protection
By the middle of the twentieth century, many charities were
soliciting nationally, having adopted advanced methods of contacting
the public. 12 In order to communicate with new audiences, they hired
"professional solicitors" who were experienced with mass
communication. 13 With the surge of non-local organizations
requesting donations, states became 14increasingly concerned with
protecting their consumers from fraud.
The first charitable solicitation regulation case decided on
First Amendment grounds was Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for
a Better Environment.15 In that case, the Village of Schaumburg,
Illinois, enacted an ordinance mandating that at least 75% of the
gross funds raised go to the charitable purposes of an organization.'6
The Schaumburg ordinance regulated whether an organization could
disseminate its message based upon the percentage of gross revenues
it retained from the solicitations. 17 One group, Citizens for a Better
Environment, hired professional solicitors to canvass neighborhoods
to promote its charitable purpose and solicit financial support.' 8 More
than 75% of the funds raised, however, 9were paid directly to the
solicitors, thereby violating the ordinance.'
When the case eventually reached the United States Supreme
Court in 1980, the Court concluded that the ordinance was a "direct
and substantial limitation on protected activity," and thus, could not
be sustained unless it served a governmental interest. 20 The Court

12See Errol Copilevitz, Nonprofit Symposium: The HistoricalRole of the First

Amendment in CharitableAppeals, 27 STETSON L. REV. 457, 463 (1997).
13 id.
14 See id.

"5 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
16 Id. at 624.
17 Id. at 624. Solicitors were required to have a permit in order to canvass the
neighborhoods. The ordinance required that the charity prove that 75% of the funds

were going directly to the charity before the permit application was approved. Id.
18Id. at 625.
'9 Id. at 626.
20 Id. at 636.
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considered the inflexibility of the ordinance significant. 2 1 The rule
arbitrarily classified all charities into one group, with no allowance
for nontraditional, advocacy-oriented organizations that incur
substantial administrative expenses. 22
The Court concluded that an appeal for support by a
charitable organization was fully protected free speech and not a form
of commercial speech,23 despite the solicitation for charitable
donations. 24 Because advocacy and the dissemination of ideas and
information were so closely tied to the solicitations, the Court
reasoned, the entire activity was entitled to First Amendment
protection. 2 Therefore, the Court ruled that because the statute was
insufficiently related to a compelling governmental interest, it was an
unconstitutional restraint on protected speech. 26 Justice Rehnquist,
the lone dissenter, argued that the Court should have applied a less
stringent standard: the solicitations should only be afforded the
protection that is given to commercial speech. 7
Four years later, the regulation of charitable solicitations was
again considered by the Supreme Court in Secretary of State of
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. 28 The primary issue in Munson
was whether a variable percentage limitation on the amount
professional solicitors receive could survive the standard set forth in
Schaumburg.29 Maryland enacted a statute restricting solicitors'
21 Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636.
22

id.

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (describing the First Amendment protection afforded to
23

commercial speech). "[T]he speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot
simply be speech on a commercial subject ....
Our question is whether speech
which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' is so removed from
any 'exposition of ideas,' and from 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in
its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,' that it
lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not." Id. (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
24 See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636.
25 See id. at 634.
26

Id. at 639.

27

See id. at 640 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

28 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
29

Id. at 949-50.
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portion to a maximum of 25% of the fundraising revenues.3 ° The
statute, however, also allowed a charitable organization to file a
waiver if the restriction interfered with fundraising efforts. 3' In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that the flexibility included within the
Maryland statute could not withstand the standard delineated in
Schaumburg.32 A common theme within the majority's opinion was
that charities should not be afforded less protection because
professional solicitors are communicating on their behalf.33 Charities'
right to free speech was the fundamental issue, regardless of who was
delivering the message. 34 Additionally, as in Schaumburg, the Court
ruled that the Maryland statute was based on "a fundamentally
mistaken premise that high solicitation costs are an accurate measure
of fraud.'35
The third case in the trilogy of Supreme Court cases involving
the regulation of charitable solicitations was Riley v. National
Federationof the Blind of North Carolina, decided in 1988. 36 In that
case, the National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina
challenged a North Carolina statute prohibiting professional
fundraisers from retaining an "unreasonable" or "excessive" fee. 37
Fees were defined by a three-tier system. 38 A fee of up to 20% of the
gross receipts was considered reasonable. 39 A fee of 20% to 35% was
deemed unreasonable unless the organization could show that it was
an advocacy-oriented charity. 40 Finally, a fee exceeding 35% was
presumed unreasonable, but the solicitor could rebut the presumption
by showing that the fee was necessary because of the nature of the
charitable organization. 4 '
30

Riley, 487 U.S. at 950.

31Id. at 952.
32

Id. at 964-65.

33See id. at 956 n.6.
34id.
31Id. at
36

966.
487 U.S. 781 (1988).

"7Id. at 784, 786.
38

Id. at 786.

39 Id.

at 785-86.

4o See id. at 786.
41 id.
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The Court was not persuaded that the three-tiered system was
sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. 42 One of
the justifications put forth by North Carolina was that charities'
speech must be regulated for their own benefit.43 In rejecting that
argument, the Court stated, "we presume that speakers, not the
government, know best both what they want to say and how to say
it.",44 Despite North Carolina's attempt to adhere to the flexibility
requirements set forth in Schaumburg and Munson, the Court held
that "the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice
speech for efficiency. 45 Thus, the Court ruled that the statute's
percentage-based system of regulating charities did not serve a
it down as a violation of
compelling government
46 interest, and struck
Amendment.
the First

III. United Cancer Council: The IRS Takes Action
In the wake of the states' seemingly endless losing streak with
regard to the regulation of charitable solicitations, in 1997, the IRS
finally took action. Historically, the IRS played a significant role in
the regulation of charitable organizations because federal tax
exemption is extremely important to their day-to-day operations. The
IRS's strategy was to revoke the tax-exempt status of charities that
overpaid solicitors.47 The IRS has a legitimate interest in ensuring
that a majority of tax-deductible donations actually go to the charity
and not to fundraisers.
The IRS's strategy was challenged in United CancerCouncil,
Inc. v. Commissioner ("United Cancer ,).48 Facing a financial crisis,
United Cancer hired Watson & Hughey Co. ("W&H"), a fundraising
firm willing to advance the costs of the solicitation program.49 In
return, W&H was entitled to receive fees for services rendered and
the exclusive right to unrestricted use of the mailing list created under
4' Riley, 487 U.S. at 789.

41 See id. at 790.
44
41

46

Id. at 791.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 789.

47 See, e.g., United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 326, 327,
329, 334 (1997) [hereinafter United Cancer I].
48 109 T.C. 326.
49

Id. at 330.
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the contract. 50 Over a five-year period, United Cancer accumulated
$28.8 million dollars in gross receipts stemming from W&H's direct
mail solicitations. 5' According to the terms of the contract, W&H
received $26.5 million and United Cancer received the remaining
$2.3 million. 52 The IRS revoked United Cancer's § 501(c)(3) taxexempt status 53 on the grounds that the contract was so favorable that
it resulted in a private benefit to W&H.54 In an amended filing, the
IRS added an inurement 55 claim
that would become the focus of both
56
the IRS and the Tax Court.
Concentrating on the inurement claim, the Tax Court held that
the IRS properly revoked United Cancer's tax-exempt status because
its net earnings inured to W&H.5 7 The ruling was contingent upon the
Tax Court's finding that W&H was an "insider" with respect to
United Cancer, and that the compensation it received was
unreasonable.5958 The issue on appeal was whether W&H was, in fact,
an "insider."
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit employed a "functional" test
to determine that W&H was not an insider. The court looked to the
"reality of control rather than to the insider's place in [the]
organization." 6 The contract was more favorable to W&H, the court
held, because United Cancer was desperate to stay afloat, not because
it exercised control over the organization. 62 As the government

50

Id. at 331.

51 Id.
52

Id. at 332.

53 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002).
54 United CancerI, 109 T.C. at 334.

5' The concept of inurement has been described as follows: "A charity is not to
siphon its earnings to its founder, or the members of its board, or their families, or
anyone else fairly to be described as an insider .. . ." United Cancer Council v.
Commissioner, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (1999) [hereinafter United CancerI].
56 United CancerI, 109 T.C. at 328.
17 Id. at 398-99.

" Id. at 397.
59 See United Cancer I, 165 F.3d at 1175.
60 Id. at 1176.
61 id.

62 Id. at 1178.
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conceded, the contract was negotiated at arm's length. 63 In the court's
view, the ability to "drive a hard bargain" with a charitable
organization did not make W&H an insider. 64 The court also noted
that United Cancer would not have been able to discontinue its
contract if W&H had been in control of the organization. 65
Although the court did not find liability on inurement
grounds, it did recognize that United Cancer's board may have
imprudently negotiated it's contract with W&H. 66 Arguably, United
Cancer was not operating for solely charitable purposes, but rather
for the private benefit of W&H.6 7 The board of a charitable
organization owes a duty of care to the mission of the charity, just as
the board of a for-profit corporation owes a duty of care to its
shareholders. 68 The court held that distributing over 90% of gross
revenues to the fundraiser may constitute a breach of that duty, which
supports a finding that United Cancer was conferring a private benefit
to W&H
H. 69 This may be true even if W&H is not deemed to have
controlled or exercised undue influence over the charity. 7 ° Because
the Tax Court did not consider
the private benefit claim, the Seventh
7
Circuit remanded the issue. 1

IV. Intermediate Sanctions: A New Weapon in the IRS
Arsenal
In Munson, Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that
limiting the amount professional fundraisers receive fulfills donors'
expectations that the bulk of their donation will go directly to the
charitable purpose they selected. 72 In an effort to meet those
expectations, in January 2002, the Treasury Department released the
final regulations for I.R.C. § 4958, a groundbreaking law designed to
63

United CancerII, 165 F.3d at 1175.

64 Id.
65

id.

66

Id. at 1179.

67

id.

68

Id. at 1180.

69

id.

70

id.

71 Id.
72

at 1180.

See Munson, 467 U.S. at 980 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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impose excise taxes on individuals who reap excess benefits from
tax-exempt organizations. 73 Before § 4958 was enacted, when assets
of a charitable organization inured to the benefit of an individual, the
only options the IRS had was to revoke the organization's tax-exempt
status or ignore the inurement.74 The sanctions imposed by § 4958
seek to find a middle ground by penalizing those individuals who are
enriched by the transaction and the officers and directors who allow
the enrichment.75
Referred to as "intermediate sanctions" by the non-profit
community, 76 under § 4958, an excise tax of 25% is imposed on
every excess benefit transaction.77 The excise tax is increased to
200% of the excess benefit if the transaction is not corrected in a
timely manner. 78 Additionally, a secondary tax equal to 10% of the
excess benefit is imposed individually on an "organization manager"
who approves or condones an excess benefit transaction. 9
What makes this law unique is on whom the primary tax is
imposed. For intermediate sanctions to be imposed, the transaction
must confer an economic benefit of greater value to a "disqualified
person" than the consideration received by the charitable
organization. Under § 4958(f), the definition of a "disqualified
person" is extremely broad. Anyone who, within five years prior to
the transaction in question, was in a position to "exercise substantial
influence over the affairs of the organization" or a family member of
that individual is deemed "disqualified.", 8 1 The definition also
includes any person who owns 35% or more of a corporation's voting

73 See generally I.R.C. § 4958 (2002) (imposing an excise tax on
"disqualified

individuals" who privately benefit from their association with a charitable
organization).
74 J. Eric Taylor, Intermediate Sanctions Under § 4958: An Overview of the
ProposedRegulations, 73 FLA. BAR J. 73, 73 (1999).
75 id.
76 id.
77

I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1) (2002).

78 Id. § 4958(b).

79Id. § 4958(a)(2) ("The tax imposed by this paragraph shall be paid by any
organization manager who participated in the excess benefit transaction.")
80 Id. § 4958(c)(1)(A).
" Id. §§ 4958(f)(1)(A), (B).

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 15: 2

82
power, a partnership's profit interest, or trust's beneficial interest.
Individuals are also described as "disqualified persons" if they
engage in revenue-sharing transactions with a charitable
organization. The IRS defines such transactions as those wherein
employees or independent contractors receive some or all of their
compensation based on the revenue of the organization. 84 These
transactions are most common in the health care field and in
compensation arrangements with fundraisers. 85 In the IRS's proposed
regulations, if an individual's compensation is based primarily on
revenues derived from activities within his control, he is
automatically deemed to have "substantial influence" over the
organization. 86 In the final regulations, however, rather than a per se
rule, revenue-based compensation is merely one of the factors
considered in determining "substantial influence." 87 Nevertheless, the
final regulations indicate that if the benefits received by the
disqualified person are not proportional to the services provided, the
transaction might constitute an excess benefit
transaction even if the
88
compensation paid to him was reasonable.

V. Liberal Relief Provisions Balance Stringent
Restrictions
Although the requirements for transactions between charitable
organizations and third parties seem strict, there are three provisions
in the final regulations that offer substantial relief: the initial contract

83

I.R.C. §§ 4958(f)(1), (3) (2002).
Id. § 4958(c)(2).

84

id.

"

See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(g) (2002) (providing two examples of revenuesharing, in example 10 and 11, both within a health care setting); Eugenia Stark,
85

Note, The Tangled Web of DisqualifiedPersons:A Temporary Treasury Regulation

Analysis, 21 VA. TAX REV. 277, 290-91 (2001) (discussing the status of revenuesharing arrangements, which are commonly found in the health care industry).
86 See Failure by Certain Charitable Organizations to Meet Certain
Qualification Requirements; Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions, 63 Fed. Reg.
41,486-01, 41,488, 41,490 (proposed Aug. 4, 1998) (codified, in relevant part, at 26
C.F.R. § 53.4958-3 (2002)).
87 Intermediate Sanctions, 26 C.F.R. § 53. 4 958-3(c) (2002).
88

Id.
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rule,89 the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, 90 and the written
opinion safe harbor.' The effect of these provisions is two-fold:
charitable organizations are empowered to control their day-to-day
operations and, if they follow the regulations, charities are
immunized from revocation of their tax-exempt status.
A. Initial Contract Rule
The initial contract rule, also known as the "one free bite
rule," excludes transactions from intermediate sanctions if the
individual with whom the charitable organization contracts is not
92
deemed a "disqualified person" at the time the contract is made.
This exception applies regardless of whether the individual receives
an excess benefit. 93 An "initial contract" is defined as a binding,
written contract with a fixed payment amount between the charitable
organization and a third party, who, at the time the contract became
binding, is not a "disqualified person." 94 A "fixed payment" consists
of a specific amount of cash or property, or a fixed formula based
upon "preestablished, objective criteria."95 Thus, bonuses and other
discretionary disbursements are not protected by the initial contract
rule. 96 Additionally, the rule does not apply if the contract is
materially modified or if the individual
fails to substantially perform
97
contract.
the
under
obligations
his
There is an important reason why this provision protects
charitable organizations. In order to be protected by this provision,
charities must negotiate a specific, rather than a percentage-based,
fee. By using specific dollar amounts, charities will be able to
research and compare the costs of similar services more easily. Also,
specific fees may be structured in a way that maximizes the charities'
total revenue. For example, a charity may negotiate a fee that
'9Id. § 53.4958-1(f)(2).
90

Id. § 53.4958-6.

9"Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(iii).
92 Intermediate Sanctions, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(iii)
(2002).
93id.
94 See id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(iii).
95

Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii).

96

See id.

9'See id. §§ 53.4958-4(a)(3)(iii), (iv).
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represents 20% of projected donations and an additional specific fee
if the professional solicitor raises more. So long as the additional fees
are not discretionary, this fee schedule offers charities, and the
professional. solicitors, protection under the initial contract rule, in
addition to encouraging the solicitation company to raise as much in
total revenue as possible.
However, there is a situation where the "one free bite" rule
fails to protect charitable organizations in most situations. In order
for the charity to be protected, a binding, written agreement must be
in place before an individual becomes a "disqualified person., 98 The
stringency of this requirement ignores the fact that a third party will
likely begin working with the organization before a final agreement is
reached. As a result, most charities will not be able to take advantage
of the "one free bite" exception.
B. The Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness
The final regulations also allow charitable organizations to
insulate themselves from intermediate sanctions by establishing a
rebuttable presumption that a transaction with a third party does not
result in an excess benefit transaction. 99 The presumption arises if
three conditions are satisfied: (1) the governing body of the
organization, consisting solely of disinterested parties, approves the
transaction; (2) the body obtains and relies upon "appropriate data as
to comparability" of the transaction to similar transactions involving
similarly situated organizations; and (3) the governing body
adequately documents the basis for its decision to approve the
transaction. 100
Regarding the second requirement, the governing body of an
organization with receipts of less than $1 million is considered to
have "appropriate data" if it obtains information on compensation
paid by three comparable organizations in comparable geographic
areas for comparable services.101 For organizations with receipts
greater than $1 million, the governing board must make a
determination about the facts and circumstances of every
transaction. 0 2 For example, the governing board may rely on a
98 See Intermediate Sanctions, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(iii) (2002).
99 See id. § 53.4958-6(b).
'0oSee

id. §§ 53.4958-6(a), (c)(1)(A).

'o'See id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).

'02 See id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i) (providing specific examples of relevant
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fundraiser compensation survey compiled by an independent firm, so
long as the data 0is3 sufficiently similar, such that it is meaningful to
the organization.
Although the rules governing the rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness are liberal, there is a significant restriction to its
applicability. The use of "reciprocal approval" arrangements to evade
the disinterested body requirement is strictly prohibited. 0 4 For
example, two board members, each financially interested in a
separate transaction awaiting approval from the board, are deemed 10to5
have a conflict of interest in approving the transaction of the other.
This prohibition offers significant protection to most charitable
organizations because entrepreneurs and local business-persons are
likely candidates for board positions in charitable organizations. This
rule protects charitable organizations from individuals who become
board members to satisfy their own business interests.
C. Written Opinion Safe Harbor
The written opinion safe harbor provision also lessens the
burden on charitable organizations, particularly organizational
managers. An organizational manager can avoid the 10% secondary
tax' 0 6 by securing a written opinion from a qualified professional that
he or she is acting appropriately and in the best interest of the
organization.' ° 7 In order to be protected, the organizational manager
must fully disclose all the relevant information.' 0 8 In the proposed
09
regulations, only attorneys were allowed to craft these opinions.'
Despite immense resistance after the discovery of Arthur Andersen's
involvement with Enron, however, the definition of "appropriate
professionals" in the final regulations was expanded to include
certified public accountants, expert accounting firms, and certain

information that the board should review in making it determination; referring, in
part, to the "facts and circumstances" test set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 53.49584(b)(2)(i)).
103 See id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i).
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(E).
'0' See id.
'o4

106

I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2) (2002).

107 See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-(1)(d)(4)(iii) (2002).
108 See id. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(iii).
109 See id.
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"independent valuation experts."' 10
The requirements for the written opinion safe harbor are
analogous to the "reliance on counsel" defense, often employed in
securities cases when the timing and character of trades or financial
documents are at issue.'11 The manager of a charitable organization
cannot hide behind the written opinion if he did not fully and
accurately disclose all the relevant information to the professional. 12
The opinion itself is not what gives rise to the protection, rather, it is
the analysis contained within the opinion based upon all of the
relevant information.' 13

VI. Intermediate Sanctions: A Reasonable Method of
Regulating Charitable Solicitations
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Riley, the
government has a legitimate interest in "preventing fraud on potential
donors and protecting against overcharging of charities by
professional fundraisers. ' ' 1 4 Preserving donor confidence is
paramount to maintaining the over $200 billion Americans donated in
2001. For example, consumers would have been far less likely to
donate to United Cancer Council if they knew that over 90% of their
donations were going directly to the solicitation company. However,
an equally difficult problem exists at the opposite end of the
spectrum: the government cannot afford to over-regulate the industry.
The government's reliance on charitable organizations continues to
grow, especially in this recession, when there are fewer and fewer
governmental dollars budgeted to social-welfare programs.
Today's charities do far more than feed the hungry: they
support the arts, encourage small business growth, provide
educational resources, and promote cultural and community growth,
to name only a few. The government cannot afford to loose the
services that charities provide. Therefore, a careful balance must be
110

See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(iii).

To invoke the defense of reliance on counsel the defendant has to show that
he (1) made complete disclosure to counsel, (2) sought advice as to the legality of
his conduct, (3) received advice that his conduct was legal, and (4) relied on that
advice in good faith. Markowski v. SEC, 34 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing
SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 1310, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
112 See Intermediate Sanctions, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(iii) (2002).
113 See id.
114Riley,

487 U.S. at 808.
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found between preserving donative intent and allowing charities to
keep their doors open by using professional solicitors. If properly
administered, intermediate sanctions will achieve this balance. These
excise taxes will protect charities from abuse by professional
solicitation companies and from their own corrupt self-interest, while
maintaining the public's perception of the integrity within charitable
organizations and promoting integrity within such entities. They will
also allow charities to operate independently, without fear that their
tax-exempt status will be revoked.
A. Charities Need Protection from Aggressive Solicitation
Companies
Both the IRS and the states have a reasonable interest in
prohibiting professional solicitors from reaping excessive benefits
from charitable donations. When a charitable organization seeks
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, the application does not require that an
attorney or someone with transactional business experience is a
member of the board.' 15 For that reason, it would not be unusual for a
small charitable organization to be run by directors who have little to
no experience with typical business matters, particularly contracts.
Aggressive solicitation companies could easily take advantage of the
situation by seeking out small, vulnerable charities. As a result, it is
not difficult to imagine how charitable organizations, such as United
Cancer Council, become contractually liable to transfer a majority of
their receipts to a solicitor.
Charitable organizations can protect themselves by taking
advantage of the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness provision
within the final regulations to I.R.C. § 4958. The presumption forces
small organizations with less than one million dollars in annual
receipts to become familiar with the rate similar organizations are
paying for similar services. After surveying the industry, charitable
organizations are far less likely to engage in disadvantageous
transactions with professional fundraisers and solicitors. Furthermore,
if organizational managers take advantage of the written opinion safe
harbor, a qualified professional could point out disadvantageous
terms before the contract is finalized. An attorney representing a
charity would not craft a written opinion that insulates a manager
from liability if the terms of the contract are grossly unfavorable to
the organization, unless it has no other means of attaining the
115 See generally IRS, Form 1023 (1998), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/

irs-pdf/k 1023.pdf.
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services.
B. Protecting Charities from Their Own Corrupt Self-Interest
The government also has a legitimate interest in protecting
donors from charitable organizations that do not see the down side to
only receiving ten cents for every dollar donated. It is difficult for a
financially struggling organization to pass up income, even when it
represents only a fraction of the total donations contributed to the
charity's purpose. If professional solicitors are willing to take over
fundraising efforts, any revenue that the charity receives may be
viewed as "free money" since they are not expending any direct
resources. Although these types of transactions should be sanctioned,
revocation of the organization's tax-exempt status is a drastic, and
possibly fatal, measure. Rather, the IRS may impose intermediate
sanctions on the excess benefit.
Some charitable organizations may argue that they should be
able to use every resource available, including unfavorable
fundraising contracts. But, as the Seventh Circuit stated in United
Cancer II, if an organization is consistently having severe financial
problems, perhaps it makes sense to close, rather than enter into
disadvantageous contracts.11 6 The public at large does not benefit
from a public charity' 17 that transfers a majority of its receipts to a
for-profit solicitor. The IRS rationalizes granting tax-exempt status to
charitable organizations because they perform services for the
community at large, rather than for the private gain of the
organizations' owners. Furthermore, the IRS has a significant interest
in prohibiting tax-exempt donations from being transferred to a forprofit enterprise. Viewed from the opposite perspective, the IRS does
not want to deny taxpayers' charitable gift deductions because,
despite taxpayers' intentions, a majority of the funds donated were
not used for charitable purposes. Therefore, although charitable
organizations operate to do "good work," entering into unfavorable
contracts according to the "free money" theory is against public
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United Cancer I, 165 F.3d at 1178.

117 See generally IRS, Instructions for Form 1023, at 5 (1998), available at

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/k1023.pdf. There are two types of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt organizations: public charities and private foundations. Generally, in
order to be a public charity, the organization must derive at least 35% of its receipts
from public donations. An organization would usually prefer to be a public charity
because the yearly filing and maintenance requirements are far less stringent. See
id. at 5.

2003]

Intermediate Sanctions

policy and should be sanctioned.

VII. Conclusion
American consumers consistently make generous donations to
charitable organizations. Historically, philanthropic giving has been a
necessary compliment to our capitalistic marketplace and laissezfaire approach to public and government benefits. As a result,
maintaining the integrity of charitable organizations and protecting
donative intent are paramount to the success of the not-for-profit
community. Disadvantageous contracts with professional fundraisers
threaten that success.
The trilogy of Supreme Court cases demonstrates the states'
inability to regulate charitable regulations by punishing charities
directly. 11 8 Constitutional issues aside, this approach fails to sanction
the parties deriving the benefit from the transactions: professional
solicitors and fundraisers. Intermediate sanctions, imposed by the IRS
through I.R.C. § 4958, protects charities and donors from abuse by
professional solicitors. Additionally, this provision protects charities
from their own corrupt self-interest by reducing the incentive for
charities to adopt the "free money" theory because organizational
managers may be sanctioned for acquiescing to the transaction.
Intermediate sanctions enable charities to operate independently,
including raising funds for their charitable purposes, while ensuring
that charitable donations reach the intended donee.

...See supra Part II.

